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Real versus Notional Income Splitting:  
What Canada Should Learn from the US “Innocent Spouse” Problem 
Lisa Philipps∗ 
Any evaluation of tax policy choices in the area of spousal income splitting must include 
consideration of its effects on gender equality.  Applying the classic tax policy criteria of equity, 
efficiency and administrative simplicity in a way that avoids gender is particularly unsatisfying 
in this context, because income splitting has such obviously gendered dynamics.  It is incumbent 
on income splitting advocates to consider how the rules can best be designed to enhance rather 
than detract from women’s economic equality, autonomy and security.  In order to do so, I argue, 
income splitting must be conditioned on a transfer of legal control over income or property 
between spouses.  I refer to this as ‘real’ income splitting in order to contrast it with the purely 
notional assignment of income to the tax return of a lower earning spouse.  
Notional income splitting was introduced for the first time in Canada in 2007, through the 
pension income splitting rules. 1   This comment discusses why notional income splitting is 
damaging to gender equality, and why real income splitting is a superior model.  It highlights the 
egregious risk that under notional income splitting some individuals, overwhelmingly women, 
will be targeted for enforcement actions to collect unpaid taxes on income they have never 
received or controlled.  This is because the legislation imposes joint and several liability of the 
spouses for any tax owing on pension income that is shifted between tax returns, regardless of 
who owns or has influence over the expenditure of that income.2  Joint and several liability 
continues indefinitely and given the time lag from filing to assessment, audit and enforcement, 
an individual may be pursued by tax authorities even after a relationship has ended to cover 
unpaid taxes of a former partner who has since become judgment proof.3
∗ Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.  I am indebted to Brent Cook for timely research 
assistance and helpful conversations, and grateful to Kim Brooks, Rhys Kesselman and Kevin Milligan for insightful 
comments on an earlier version. All errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author.   
  Known in the U.S. as 
the “innocent spouse” problem it is the most acute, but by no means the only way in which 
women are systematically disadvantaged by such rules.  Indeed it is likely that many more 
women will be negatively affected by the economic incentives under notional income splitting 
1 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended, ( “ITA”), s. 60(c), 56(1)(a.2), 60.03. 
2 ITA s.160(1.3).   
3 ITA s.160(2).   




for second earners to be financial dependents rather than income earners or property holders in 
their own right. Far from eliminating “second class taxpayers”, as claimed by Krzepkowski and 
Mintz, this comment explains why notional income splitting reinforces women’s second class 
economic status, by erecting new tax barriers to their financial autonomy. 4
Statistics on the take up of pension income splitting confirm that men are the primary 
beneficiaries by a significant margin. In 2010, 82% of the over one-million individuals claiming 
the deduction for split pension income were men, and they accounted for 89% of the total dollar 
amount of claims.
   
5  The revenue cost of these provisions to the federal government is projected 
to rise to over $1 billion per year in 2012. Thus pension income splitting has provided a 
substantial tax reduction for a select, male-dominated group of taxpayers who have had a portion 
of their income reported on the tax returns of their lower earning spouses, almost always women.  
Interestingly, household income data for the same year indicate that men were the sole or higher 
earners in only about 69% of couples with some earnings, yet they captured an even higher 
proportion of the benefits of pension income splitting. 6 These data drive home the need to 
consider intra-household economic disparities between men and women in any policy analysis of 
income splitting.  Its proponents tend to gloss over these intra-household effects, preferring 
instead to focus on comparing the aggregate tax burdens of single and dual earner households.7  
It was this logic that framed the Conservative Party’s 2011 election promise to introduce 
“income-sharing” for all couples with dependent children under 18, allowing “spouses the choice 
to share up to $50,000 of their household income, for federal income-tax purposes”, once the 
federal budget is balanced. 8  Before moving ahead the government should undertake a full 
evaluation of the effects of pension income splitting.9
                                                          
4 See Matt Krzepkowski and Jack Mintz, “No More Second Class Taxpayers: How Income Splitting Can Bring 
Fairness to Canada’s Single-Income Families” (April 2013) Vol.6, Issue 15 SPP Research Papers (The School of Public 
Policy, University of Calgary), at 1.   
 In considering different ways to deliver on 
5 Canada Revenue Agency, Preliminary Income Statistics – 2012 Edition (Table 4, All returns by age and sex, line 
34).    
6Statistics Canada, CANSIM 202-0105.  By way of speculation, the reasons may relate to men’s higher average 
incomes  increasing their potential benefit from income splitting, or to intra-household income distribution among 
the specific demographic that receives private pension income.   
7 See for example Krzepkowski and Mintz, supra.   
8 Conservative Party of Canada, Here for Canada: Stephen Harper’s Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Economic Growth 
(undated), 26.   
9  See  John Lester’s proposal for regular benefit-cost evaluation of all tax expenditures that are close 
substitutes for program spending, in which he includes the pension income splitting rules:  “Managing 




its election promise it should pay especially close attention to the distinction between real and 
notional income splitting.  
                
 
DISTINGUISHING REAL AND NOTIONAL MODELS OF INCOME SPLITTING 
 
A critical variable in assessing the gender equality effects of income splitting is whether 
the higher income spouse must cede legal control over the split income (or the underlying asset 
which generates the split income) in order to achieve a reduction of tax liability.  Until 2007 this 
was always the case in Canada.  That is, a transfer of income or assets in favour of the lower 
income spouse was required in order to split income for tax purposes.  The pension income 
splitting rules departed from this norm.   For the first time in the history of Canadian income tax 
law, a tax reduction can be obtained for individuals through a purely notional transfer of income 
on paper, from the tax return of the spouse who legally owns the income to the return of the non-
owning spouse.  In other words, pension income splitting allows for a shifting of tax liability to 
the lower earning spouse without any corresponding shift of legal control over economic 
resources. 10 Rather than “income sharing”, “tax sharing” would be a more accurate term to 
describe these provisions.11
The tax policy arguments against spousal income splitting are linked to the well-known 
arguments in favour of maintaining an individual, versus joint marital or familial, taxation unit.
      
12 
The case for joint taxation of couples is based on the view that “the income and expenditure of 
two individuals are not independent when they live together.”13
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Tax Expenditures and Government Program Spending: Proposals for Reform” (Vol.5, Issue 35) SPP 
Research Papers (University of Calgary School of Public Policy), 13.    
 However empirical studies have 
shown that it is far too simplistic to assume all income is pooled and shared equally within all 
10 See Frances Woolley, “ Liability Without Control: The Curious Case of Pension Income Splitting” (2007) 55 
Canadian Tax Journal  603. 
11 The phrase “income sharing” is used in the Conservative Party’s 2011 election platform, supra.   
12 For more detailed discussion of the tax policy case against joint taxation see Grace Blumberg, “Sexism in the 
Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers” (1971) 21 Buffalo Law Review 49; 
Neil Brooks, “The Irrelevance of Conjugal Units in Assessing Tax Liability”, in John Head and Richard Krever, eds., 
Tax Units and the Tax Rate Scale (Burwood, Victoria:  The Australian Research Foundation, 1996); and  House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Finance, For the Benefit of the Children: Improving Tax Fairness (Nineteenth 
Report of the Standing Committee on Finance, Sub-Committee on Tax Equity for Canadian Families with 
Dependent Children (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1999).  
13 Krzepkowski and Mintz, supra, at 2.   




households.  Rather, couples are highly diverse in the degree to which they share decision 
making about the use of household income, who manages the finances, and who benefits from 
consumption.14
From a gender equality perspective the objections to  spousal income splitting (or any 
other shift toward joint taxation of couples) typically include that it: 1) mainly benefits higher 
income married men, 2) privileges couples with a sharply gendered division of labour over all 
other household forms, 3)  discourages wives’ participation in paid work by raising the tax rate 
on ‘secondary’ earned income, and 4) reduces government revenues that could be used to fund 
transfers or services aimed at reducing labour force barriers and promoting gender equality.
 The studies indicate that even where funds are pooled in a joint account, the legal 
earner or owner still enjoys more control over how money is spent.    
15 
While agreeing with this critique overall, I also suggest it is insufficiently nuanced in tarring all 
income splitting with the same brush.  I have argued elsewhere that a feminist case can be made 
for permitting real income splitting, conditioned on shifting legal control of income or property 
to the lower income spouse. 16
If properly designed, real income splitting rules could incentivize higher income earners 
to transfer title over income or assets to their lower earning spouses, potentially enhancing the 
latter’s economic autonomy and security both during the marriage, and in the event of 
relationship breakdown.  Such transfers would also serve materially to recognize and 
compensate, at least in part, the unpaid caregiving and other household labour performed by a 
much lower earning spouse, usually a woman.  These incentive effects have been documented in 
the UK which moved from joint marital taxation to an individual unit in 1990, but allowed 
   
                                                          
14 See Peter Burton, Shelley Phipps and Frances Woolley, “Inequality with the Household Reconsidered”, in S 
Jenkins and J Micklewright, eds., Inequality and Poverty Re-examined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and 
Marjorie Kornhauser, “Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return” (1993) 
45 Hastings Law Journal 63.    
15 See Jonathan Kesselman, Income Splitting and Joint Taxation: What’s Fair? (Montreal: Institute for Research on 
Public Policy, 2008) 25-34; Kathleen Lahey, Women and Employment: Removing Fiscal Barriers to Women’s Labour 
Force Participation (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada), 2005; Alexandre Laurin and Jonathan Rhys Kesselman, 
Income Splitting for Two-Parent Families:  Who Gains, Who Doesn’t, and At What Cost?  (Toronto: CD Howe 
Institute Commentary 335, 2011), at 3, 13-15; Lisa Philipps, “Income Splitting and Gender Equality: The Case for 
Incentivizing Intra-Household Wealth Transfers”, in Kim Brooks, Asa Gunnarson, Lisa Philipps and Maria Wersig 
(eds.), Challenging Gender Inequality in Tax Policy Making: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing Inc., 
2011) 177-194; Woolley, supra note 16; and Lawrence Zelenak, “Marriage and the Income Tax Act” (1994) 67 
Southern California Law Review339, at 380.   
16 Philipps, supra note 21.  .   




outright transfers of property between spouses without attribution of income. 17   Likewise, 
Schuetze found that self-employed men in Canada are more likely to allocate salary, wages or 
profits to their wives for tax purposes, compared to their counterparts in the US who need only 
file a joint return with a lower earning spouse to reduce their personal tax rate.18
A possible objection to real income splitting is the difficulty of ensuring that inter-
spousal transfers actually take place and are legally effective rather than sham transactions.  One 
simple way to encourage compliance would be to require a declaration in prescribed form by the 
transferor spouse that legal ownership of the split income has been gifted or otherwise 
transferred absolutely to the other spouse.  The existing pension income splitting rules already 
require a joint election and certification that both spouses agree to the designated amount being 
deducted on the pensioner’s return and included in the other spouse’s income, and understand 
that they are jointly and severally liable for any resulting tax, interest and penalties.
  Even if the sole 
motive for such transfers is tax minimization, they must be legally enforceable to have the 
desired effect.  
19  
Undoubtedly the transferor spouse would in many cases retain some informal influence or would 
benefit from the expenditure of the funds, but this does not take away the value of giving lower 
earning spouses legal title to a greater share of the household income. Studies of family 
economic behaviour indicate that legal ownership comes with a greater sense of entitlement to 
participate in decision making.20  As Zelenak suggests, property owners often make consumption 
decisions cooperatively with a spouse, but ultimately “they still have control over the source of 
the income (as well as control over whether to stay married).”21
                                                          
17 M Stephens and J Ward-Batts found that lower income spouses reported a larger share of household investment 
income after the reform than they had before providing “strong evidence” of tax motivated property transfers, 
though most couples did not take full advantage of the potential for reducing taxes in this manner:  “The Impact of 
Taxation on the Intra-Household Allocation of Assets: Evidence from the UK” (2004) 88 Journal of Public Economics 
1989.    
 On divorce, family law rights to 
claim a share of assets can be difficult and expensive to enforce against an unwilling ex-spouse.  
Gaining documented title to assets is therefore an important source of future economic security 
for a low earning spouse, providing a more meaningful option to exit from relationships which 
18 Herbert Schuetze, “Income Splitting Among the Self-Employed” (2006) 39 Canadian Journal of Economics 1195.   
19 Canada Revenue Agency, Joint Election to Split Income (Form T1032). 
20 See P Burton, S Phipps and F Woolley, “Inequality within the Household Reconsidered” in S Jenkins and J 
Micklewright (eds), Inequality and Poverty Re-Examined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
21  Zelenak, supra note 21, , at 357.   




should also translate into greater bargaining power within them.22  For all these reasons, tax rules 
that allow for real income splitting could have some gender equality-enhancing effects.23
By contrast, notional income splitting of the kind introduced in Canada in 2007 reinforces 
gender inequalities, because it involves the transfer of tax liability without any legal requirement 
to share control over the income that gives rise to it.  The drafters of this policy presume that 
income is pooled within the household and this is precisely the problem.  As Lahey has pointed 
out, “[g]iving people who do not share incomes or property the benefit of presumed sharing 
eliminates any incentive they might otherwise have to share.”
     
24
A further challenge is that any income earned independently by the transferee spouse will 
be stacked on top of the split income, raising fiscal barriers to women’s equal participation in 
paid labour.  This is the primary reason why most tax policy analysts reject joint taxation.
 If the law is amended to allow 
notional income splitting of up to $50,000 per annum, many couples who would otherwise 
engage in real income splitting through existing legal means such as spousal RRSPs or payment 
of wages or dividends to a spouse, will likely opt instead simply to shift income on paper.  Doing 
so would often be simpler, and would allow the wealthier spouse to avoid transferring title to any 
assets or income. Notional income splitting would push couples away from existing tax planning 
mechanisms by which a non-earning or low earning spouse currently can acquire some 
independent financial resources.   
25  The 
proposal by Krzepkowski and Mintz to eliminate the spousal credit for couples who split income, 
replacing it with an employment income credit for the lower earning spouse, is an unsatisfying 
response.26
                                                          
22 For a more detailed elaboration of these arguments in favour of real income splitting see Philipps, supra note 21, 
at 240-250.    
  While alleviating the stacking effect on the first $10,822 (in 2012) of employment 
income received by a second earner, any dollars above that modest amount would still be 
exposed to steeper tax rates because she (usually) is also reporting a share of the primary 
breadwinner’s income.  Moreover, it is unclear why the second earner should not be able to 
claim the credit on investment, business or other independent sources of income.  Contrary to its 
claim, the proposal would create “second class taxpayers” who lose access to a comprehensive 
23 For a similar analysis see Laurin and Kesselman, supra note 21, at 17-18.   
24 Lahey, supra note 21, at  26. See also Woolley, supra note 16, at  613.   
25 See articles and reports cited supra at notes 18 and 21. 
26 Krzepkowski and Mintz, supra, at 10-11. 




basic personal credit that is available to every other Canadian resident, and are exposed to 
relatively high marginal tax rates on any income beyond $10,822 of wages.    
Notional income splitting therefore tends to exacerbate economic inequality between 
spouses, because it disincentivizes both intra-household transfers and independent earning by the 
partner who is reporting split income.    In theory, wives should be able to bargain for a 
redistribution of income or property in return for signing a joint election to split income.  In 
practice, many economically dependent wives lack the information, the sense of entitlement, or 
the bargaining power to demand greater control over household resources.  It is common simply 
to trust that the higher earning spouse will do the right thing in covering taxes and providing for 
family expenses.  The potential for this to go badly wrong for some people is illustrated vividly 
in the “innocent spouse” cases which have plagued the US income tax system.  I elaborate on the 
innocent spouse problem below in order to demonstrate the challenges raised by notional income 
splitting.    
 
THE US “INNOCENT SPOUSE” PROBLEM 
 
The nature of the problem is best illustrated through a story.  One of many well publicized 
innocent spouse cases in the US involved Carol Ross Joynt, whose husband, Howard Joynt, died 
after evading payroll and business income taxes for years. In her memoir Carol described 
suffering occasional physical abuse by Howard but also enjoying a privileged lifestyle funded 
(she believed) through her husband’s inherited wealth and the popular bar and restaurant he 
owned in Washington DC.27
                                                          
27 Carol Ross Joynt, Innocent Spouse (New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2011).   
  Though a successful journalist who earned a salary of her own, 
Carol wrote that she knew little of Howard’s business affairs and deferred to his insistence on 
managing the household finances exclusively.  Her occasional questions were met with 
reassurances that she need not worry, and she signed joint returns trusting that the accountants 
who prepared them had done so correctly.  All seemed well until Howard’s death, when Carol 
learned he had been audited by the IRS and she was now the defendant in a claim for over $3 
million in unpaid taxes, penalties and interest, an amount that exceeded the value of his entire 




estate. 28 Following a protracted appeal and with the help of legal advice she eventually reached a 
settlement with the IRS, which accepted at least in part her claim for relief under the “innocent 
spouse” provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.29
The US legislated joint liability for spouses who file a joint marital return in 1938.
    
30 
Importantly, this liability is not limited to the taxes shown as owing on the face of the return, but 
applies to all taxes subsequently assessed on unreported or misreported income.31  The liability is 
not limited in time or affected by the terms of a divorce decree or separation agreement.32
Judicial calls for legislative relief were answered with the enactment of the first 
generation of innocent spouse provisions in 1971.  These rules protected spouses from liability in 
limited circumstances involving an omission of income from the return and only in cases of 
serious financial hardship.
 Thus 
the US system poses an especially grave risk to those who are unaware that their spouses are 
engaging in aggressive avoidance or evasion of tax.  The only defense available to an unwitting 
spouse under the 1938 legislation was to invoke a common law doctrine such as duress or fraud 
to invalidate the signature on the joint return.  The harsh effects of the law were revealed in a 
series of cases involving wives who were made to pay taxes and penalties on the ill-gotten gains 
of their judgment proof ex-husbands, even if, for example, the unreported income had been 
embezzled from the wife’s own business.   
33
                                                          
28 For a media account of the Joynt case and several others see Sandra Block, “IRS ‘innocent spouse’ rules can be 
tough”, USATODY.com, June 24, 2011. For more scholarly accounts of litigated cases see for example Natalie Hoyer 
Keller, “Do You, Elizabeth, Promise to Pay John's Taxes? I Do: A Review of the Innocent Spouse Provisions and a 
Proposal for Change” (1996) Utah L. Rev. 1065; Stephen A. Zorn, “Innocent Spouses, Reasonable Women and 
Divorce: The Gap Between Reality and the Internal Revenue Code” (1996) 3 Mich. J. Gender & L. 421; and 
Christopher B. Wyrick, “Till Death Do Us Part Including Our Taxes: Inequity Abounds in Spousal Joint and Several 
Tax Liability and the ‘Innocent Spouse’ Rule” (1997) 6 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 163.      
  Experience showed the law did not provide relief in all deserving 
cases, and public and judicial outcries led to successive waves of reform in 1980, 1984 and 1998 
to expand the grounds for relief.  Not surprisingly the reforms have also made the rules more 
29 IRC 6015, discussed infra.   
30 See now IRC 6013(d)(3).  The legislative history of joint return liability and innocent spouse relief is reviewed in 
Richard C.E. Beck, “The Failure of Innocent Spouse Reform” (2006/2007) 51 N.Y.L. Sch.L.Rev. 929, at 933-943; 
Michelle Lyon Drumbl, “Decoupling Taxes and Marriage: Beyond Innocence and Income Splitting” (2012-13) 
Colum. J. Tax. L. 94; and Stephanie Hunter McMahon, “An Empirical History of Innocent Spouse Relief: Do Courts 
Implement Congress’s Legislative Intent?” (2012) 12 Fla. Tax Rev. 629, at 635-645.  See also US Department of 
the Treasury, Report to the Congress on Joint Liability and Innocent Spouse Issues (February 1998).   
31 Beck, supra, at 930.   
32 US Department of the Treasury, supra, at 9. 
33 McMahon, 638-639. 




complicated.  It is now possible to apply for innocent spouse relief under three separate heads 
with overlapping but distinct criteria that require the claimant to show, for example, that she did 
not know (and in some cases did not have reason to know) of the understatement of tax, and that 
it would be inequitable to hold her liable for the unpaid tax.34  These ambiguous provisions have 
generated extensive interpretive debates and must often be applied based on limited evidence 
such as the inconsistent testimony of spouses, with the IRS delving into allegations of abuse, 
mental illness, and other intimate details of a former marriage.35  The cost to the government of 
administering these provisions is substantial.  The IRS maintains a centralized, dedicated office 
for processing innocent spouse claims, which were listed by the National Taxpayer Advocate as 
one of the IRS’s top ten litigated issues in all but one year in the last decade.36   From a taxpayer 
perspective, Drumbl has underlined the access to justice and fairness issues created when 
separated or divorced spouses, often single parents far less privileged than Carol Ross Joynt, 
must hire professional advisors and prosecute multiple levels of appeal to win the right to 
innocent spouse relief.37   While most critiques have focused on the deserving cases that still fall 
through the cracks, McMahon has also argued that the current rules are at the same time too 
liberal, opening opportunities for spouses to collude in abusing the provisions to evade taxes.38
 While there is a range of opinions about how best to fix the innocent spouse rules, US 
commentators seem to agree that they are costly and unfair despite several rounds of legislative 
and administrative reform.  Moreover, it is overwhelmingly women who bear the brunt of this 
problem.  Tax policy makers ought to consider whether Canada risks importing this problem as it 
implements notional income splitting rules akin to US joint filing. 
   
      
  
LESSONS FOR CANADIAN TAX POLICY MAKERS 
 
                                                          
34 IRC 6015(b), (c) and (f).  
35 For discussion of the interpretive and evidentiary challenges of applying the rules see Drumbl, supra; Stephanie 
Hunter McMahon, “What Innocent Spouse Relief Says About Women and the Rest of Us” (2013) SSRN; and Lily 
Kahng, “Innocent Spouses: A Critique of the New Tax Laws Governing Joint and Several Tax Liability” (2004) 49:2 
Villanova Law Rev. 261.  .   
36 McMahon (2013), supra, at 4.   
37 Drumbl, supra.    
38 McMahon (2013), supra.   




Notional income splitting carries a real risk that taxes owing on income earned by a 
wealthier spouse will be unjustly recovered from the other.  Admittedly, Canada’s existing 
pension income splitting rules do not create the same degree of risk  as the US joint filing 
system.  First, the joint liability of spouses is limited to taxes owing on the split income, unlike 
the US where it extends to all unreported income of the other spouse, from any source.  In 
addition private pension income is subject to withholding at source under s.153(1) of the ITA, 
and s.153(2) provides that, 
If a pensioner and a pension transferee (as those terms are defined in section 
60.03) make a joint election under section 60.03 in respect of a split-pension 
amount (as defined in that section) for a taxation year, the portion of the amount 
deducted or withheld under subsection (1) that may be reasonably considered to 
be in respect of the split-pension amount is deemed to have been deducted or 
withheld on account of the pension transferee’s tax for the taxation year under this 
Part and not on account of the pensioner’s tax for the taxation year under this Part. 
In most cases, this deeming rule will protect the spouse who reports the income from unexpected 
tax liabilities after the fact.  But it is not a foolproof system.  A payor may fail to withhold or 
remit taxes as required under s.153(1), or the amount withheld may turn out to be inadequate to 
cover tax liability as assessed (particularly if the transferee spouse has other sources of income).   
Nor does the law require pension payors or recipients, or the CRA, to share information 
slips so that a spouse can see for themselves how much tax has been paid in advance in respect 
of pension income being reported on her return.  The CRA’s Q and A Release on pension income 
splitting states: 
 
Q.2 Is it necessary to contact the payer of the pension? 
 
A.2 Splitting eligible pension income does not have any effect on how or to whom the pension 
income is paid, so it does not involve the payer of the pension. Information slips will be prepared 
and sent to the recipient of the pension income in the same manner as previous years…. 
 
Q.6 Who will claim the tax withheld at source from the eligible pension income? 
 
A.6 The income tax that is withheld at source from the eligible pension income will have to be 
allocated from the pensioner to the spouse or common-law partner in the same proportion as the 




pension income is allocated.39
 
 
The Q&A responses suggest that spouses have no right to demand copies of information slips 
provided to pension recipients.  The Release is silent as to who bears the responsibility for 
ensuring an appropriate allocation of withheld amounts to the spouse.   
These concerns are mitigated to some degree by CRA’s prescribed form for making the 
joint election, which does require the parties to provide information about the amount of tax 
deducted at source in respect of the split income.40  Further, the ITA provides that “[a] joint 
election is invalid if the Minister establishes that a pensioner or a pension transferee has 
knowingly or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence made a false declaration in the 
joint election.”41
A far more significant risk of innocent spouse liability will arise if notional income 
splitting is opened up to a wider range of income sources and taxpayers as suggested  in the 2011 
election campaign.  Presumably the income qualified for splitting would include business and 
investment income that is not subject to withholding of tax at source, and which creates greater 
opportunities for aggressive tax avoidance or evasion by the recipient.  Cases decided under 
existing joint and several liability provisions of s.160 of the ITA substantiate this concern and 
  Thus an unscrupulous spouse who purposely understates source deductions 
may remain solely responsible for tax on the pension income, if the form is challenged and the 
Minister can prove the requisite state of mind.  However these measures may not assist in cases 
where the pension recipient is abusive or domineering, or simply makes an error, and the 
reporting spouse trusts the information provided, or is not willing or able to challenge or verify 
information about withholding.  Just as in the US, not all Canadian marriages are open and 
cooperative, and both relationship and financial circumstances of a taxpayer can change in 
unpredictable ways between the time when a joint election is signed, and the time when tax is 
finally assessed and must be paid. Realistically, though, the scale of this risk under the current 
pension income splitting rules should not be exaggerated.  While we should not overlook 
individual cases of injustice or hardship that may arise, these should be relatively rare instances 
because source deductions on pension income will usually ensure the reporting spouse has no 
additional tax to pay.   
                                                          
39 CRA Q&A Releases, 2007-07-18 -- Pension Income Splitting. 
40 CRA Form T1032 E (12), Step 5. 
41 ITA s.60.03(4).   




offer a glimpse into the potential for an unwitting spouse to be assessed for unpaid taxes, 
penalties and interest accruing over multiple years.  
In essence, s.160 provides for joint and several liability where an individual transfers 
property to a spouse for less than fair market value consideration, at a time when the individual 
owes income tax.  As with any tax debt, the normal reassessment period of three years may be 
indefinite if the primary earner has fraudulently misrepresented his (or her) income.  Moreover, 
the Courts have held that the limitation period for assessing the joint debtor only starts to run 90 
days after the first spouse is assessed for the unpaid tax, not on the earlier date when the property 
was transferred. 42   In addition, s.160 has been held to impose absolute liability that does not 
require any knowledge of the primary debtor’s unpaid tax.43  The joint debt can be enforced 
against the spouse even after the primary debtor has gone bankrupt.44 Further, where the primary 
debtor owes tax for some years that are subject to joint spousal liability and some that are not 
(for example because they post-date the transfer of assets to the spouse), CRA is under no 
obligation to apply any amounts that it recovers from the bankruptcy against the former.  Rather, 
CRA can apply recoveries to the amounts for which the primary debtor is solely liable, 
preserving its ability to assess the spouse for joint debts.45
The risk for spouses inherent in joint liability is nicely captured by Sharlow J.A.’s 
comments in the Court’s decision against Mrs. Wannan: 
  
While not every use of section 160 is unwarranted or unfair, there is always some 
potential for an unjust result.  There is no due diligence defence to the application 
of section 160.  It may apply to a transferee of property who has no intention to 
assist the primary debtor to avoid the payment of tax.  Indeed, it may apply to a 
transferee who has no knowledge of the tax affairs of the primary debtor.  
However section 160 has been validly enacted as part of the law of Canada.  If the 
Crown seeks to rely on section 160 in a particular case, it must be permitted to do 
so if the statutory conditions are met.46
 
   
                                                          
42 See Madsen v. The Queen, 2004 DTC 3058 (TCC).   
43 See Wannan v. The Queen, 2003 DTC 5715 (FCA); No.605 v. MNR, 59 DTC 159 (TAB). 
44See Clause v. The Queen, 2010 DTC 1298 (TCC); Wannan v. The Queen, 2003 DTC 5715 (FCA); Bergeron v. The 
Queen, 2003 DTC 1491 (TCC); The Queen v. Heavyside, 97 DTC 5026 (FCA).   
45 Ibid. 
46 Supra, at paragraph 3.   




It should be remembered that in s.160 cases the joint debtor has actually received a transfer of 
property that may be available to satisfy the tax debt, or which has in some way enriched the 
joint debtor.  The spouse’s situation may be much worse with notional income splitting as joint 
liability is imposed without any requirement for an actual transfer of income or property. 
The US experience shows it is not a simple matter to design relieving provisions for 
innocent spouses that will effectively prevent injustice without imposing burdensome costs on 
taxpayers and tax authorities, and without opening up opportunities for not-so-innocent spouses 
to collude to defeat the tax authorities.  At the very least, this issue needs to be thought through 
from the standpoint of gender equality, as well as administrative feasibility, before income 
splitting rules are broadened.  The preferred approach would be to make tax advantages 
conditional upon a legal transfer of income or assets – that is to enact real income splitting rather 




The so-called innocent spouse problem refers to unjust imposition of joint return liability 
on a lower income spouse, where the higher earner has become judgment proof or is harder to 
pursue for unpaid taxes.  In relatively egalitarian relationships characterized by strong 
transparency and communication, spouses may well structure their affairs to ensure that taxes are 
covered by the higher income spouse and that there is shared benefit from the tax savings on split 
income, if not from the full amount of the underlying income.  However, studies of household 
economic behaviour suggest this best case scenario does not apply in all cases.   Rather, some 
spouses will sign a joint election form without full or accurate information about the implications 
for their own tax liability, and without gaining control over any additional household resources.  
The lower earning spouse (almost always a woman in the innocent spouse cases) may then 
become the target of enforcement actions to collect unpaid tax, perhaps after the relationship has 
ended, and whether or not she has access to the underlying income.  The US experience is that 
this happens with alarming frequency, and their chosen remedy of granting special relief to 
spouses deemed “innocent” has created its own set of inequities and administrative burdens.   
I highlight the innocent spouse problem in this comment as just the tip of an iceberg.  It is 
one of the more visible, measurable ways in which notional income splitting regimes undermine 




gender equality, and one that should dissuade governments from extending notional income 
splitting any further.  But there is a larger and less visible part of the iceberg which should be at 
least as concerning to policy makers.  Notional models of income splitting actually remove 
incentives for a wealthier spouse to place legal title to assets or income in the hands of a partner 
who does not have equal earning power, or who forgoes opportunities in the paid labour market 
in order to focus on parenting or other unpaid care roles.  It also raises the marginal effective tax 
rate on any income earned independently by that partner, raising the fiscal barriers to women’s 
equal participation in markets.  These effects may attract less immediate attention but will be far 
more pervasive than the innocent spouse problem.  Wrongheaded from the standpoint of 
economic efficiency, such a policy also would be a step back in the process of securing Canadian 
women’s economic and social equality.  Real income splitting models should be considered as an 
alternative that could be appropriately designed to have some gender equality promoting effects.   
   
